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As early as 1958, the Supreme Court noted that "[a]s technological
progress has increased the flow of commerce ... the need for jurisdiction
over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase .... But it is a mistake
to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on
the personal jurisdiction of state courts."1 The expansion of traditional
limits on personal jurisdiction in the face of modern communications en-
tered a dramatic new phase with the Internet boom of the 1990s.2 The
ability of the Internet to connect parties in "cyberspace" and allow them to
conduct business and enter into legal agreements in a virtual environment
creates unique challenges for the geographically based rules that tradition-
ally define a court's jurisdiction. 3
When one creates a public website, the Internet makes it accessible to
anyone with a web connection and a computer.4 This gives parties the
ability to share information and create legal relationships without regard
to the geographic borders that ordinarily define the logical limits of a
1. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
2. See Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1095, 1107
(1996) ("The personal jurisdiction problems posed by virtual commerce and In-
ternet telepresence are in many ways the culmination of a long evolution of legal
doctrine occasioned by changing technology."); see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that "with this
global [information] revolution looming on the horizon, the development of the
law concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on Internet
use is in its infant stages").
3. See Mark C. Dearing, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Can the Traditional
Principles and Landmark Cases Guide the Legal System into the 21st Century ?, 4 J. TECH.
L. & POL'Y 4, 4-5 (1999) (noting potential liabilities of placing information on
Internet). Due to the global nature of the Internet, merely creating a website may
expose the party responsible for that website to worldwide liabilities. See id. (not-
ing expansive global potential for liability arising from Internet activity). The Sec-
ond Circuit characterized the application of established personal jurisdiction law
"in the fast-developing world of the internet [as] somewhat like trying to board a
moving bus." Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997).
4. SeeJoseph S. Burns & Richard A. Bales, Personal Jurisdiction and the Web, 53
ME. L. REv. 29, 40 (2001) (noting some courts hold parties "present" at every loca-
tion where their web-based information is accessed). See also David M. Fritch, Arti-
cle, Click Here for Lawsuit - Trespass to Chattels in Cyberspace, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 31,
33-34 (2004) ("Today, the Interent is unparalleled as the world's largest repository
of content, accessible to anyone with a computer and a browser.").
(931)
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court's jurisdiction. 5 Even a local website can connect visitors around the
world with the site's owner, whether the owner specifically intended such
connections or not.
6
Cyberspace, with its expansive reach and lack of a geographical situs,
often confounds courts trying to apply traditional doctrines of personal
jurisdiction. 7 Courts deciding early Internet jurisdiction cases were reluc-
tant to adapt conventional personal jurisdiction rules to accommodate the
far-reaching potential of online contacts. 8 The continuing growth of the
Internet, and the accompanying proliferation of Internet-based transac-
tions, required courts to develop an evolving approach to jurisdiction that
adapts customary notions of personal jurisdiction to the realities of cyber-
space. 9 Although technology creates new ways to make meaningful con-
tacts-and generate disputes-between local plaintiffs and nonresident
defendants, the traditional jurisdictional paradigms remain unchanged.' 0
The touchstone for constitutionally asserting jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants remains whether they made a purposeful connection with the
forum. 1 This requires broad judicial inquiry into both online and offline
activities to uncover a nonresident defendant's intent to conduct activities
in the forum state. 12
5. SeeJohn P. Collins, Trying to Board a Moving Volkswagen, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y
Rrv. 535, 537-38 (1998) (noting challenges of applying traditional personal juris-
diction rules in cyberspace).
6. See Burns & Bales, supra note 4, at 40 (noting expansive nature of web con-
tacts). The following example illustrates the potentially expansive nature of web
contacts: "If, for example, X from Kentucky places information on the Web, and
that information is accessed from New York, California, and Texas, X is present,
for purposes of personal jurisdiction, in New York, California, Texas, and Ken-
tucky." Id.
7. See Collins, supra note 5, at 538 (noting difficulty of applying personal juris-
diction rules to web transactions).
8. See, e.g., Pres-Kap v. Sys. One, Direct Access, 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (declining to exercise personal jurisdiction for out-of-state
online database service). In rejecting the use of online contacts as grounds for
personal jurisdiction, the Pres-Kap court noted "a contrary decision would, we
think, have far-reaching implications for business and professional people who use
'on-line' computer services for which payments are made to out-of-state companies
where the database is located." Id.
9. See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)
(examining whether electronic contacts are, by their nature, sufficient under Due
Process Clause to support personal jurisdiction).
10. See Allan Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32
INT'L LAw. 1167, 1191 (1998) (noting complexity of applying traditional laws in
cyberspace is not "uniquely problematic").
11. See id. at 1182 (noting that defendant's amenability to jurisdiction "must
be the product of his own volition").
12. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003)
(requiring evidence that website owners "purposefully avail themselves of con-
ducting activity in the forum state").
932 [Vol. 49: p. 931
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This Casebrief examines the Third Circuit's approach to applying
personal jurisdiction rules to cyberspace. 13 Part II of this Casebrief re-
views the traditional rules of personal jurisdiction, as well as the emerging
case law applying these rules to questions of Internet-based personal juris-
diction, both within the Third Circuit and beyond. 14 Part III discusses the
Third Circuit's approach to Internet-based personal jurisdiction, as ap-
plied in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.. 15 Finally, Part IV discusses the
impact of the Third Circuit's decision on personal jurisdiction issues as
applied to the operation of a commercial website.
1 6
II. EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
TO THE INTERNET
A. Traditional Rules of Personal Jurisdiction
Whenever defendants reach out beyond the borders of their home
states (or countries) to conduct activities that create legal relationships
and obligations with persons in another state, they may subject themselves
to jurisdiction in that foreign state's courts for disputes arising from those
activities. 17 The reach of a court's jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants, however, is limited. 18 To protect the interests of nonresident de-
fendants, numerous restrictions are placed on the scope of a court's
jurisdiction. 19 If jurisdiction is not prohibited by a forum-specific long-
arm statute, a court's ability to assert authority over nonresident defend-
ants remains subject to constitutional due process limitations, embodied
in the rules of general and specific personal jurisdiction.2 0
13. For a discussion of the Toys "R" Us decision and the Third Circuit's analy-
sis, see infra notes 88-127 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the traditional rules of personal jurisdiction, see infra
notes 17-35 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the emerging framework
of personal jurisdiction based on Internet-based activities, see infra notes 36-87
and accompanying text.
15. 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's ap-
proach to extending personal jurisdiction for Intemet-based activities, see infra
notes 88-127 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the practical impact of the Third Circuit's ruling for
practitioners in evaluating personal jurisdiction questions stemming from opera-
tion of a commercial website, see infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
17. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950) (noting
purpose of personal jurisdiction).
18. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting due process limitations on personal jurisdiction).
19. See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) ("[P]ersonal juris-
diction protects the individual interest that is implicated when a nonresident de-
fendant is haled into a distant and possibly inconvenient forum.").
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1. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction permits courts to exercise their authority over
nonresident defendants even when the defendants' contacts with the state
are unrelated to the plaintiffs' claims. 2' General jurisdiction is limited to
nonresident defendants who have "substantial contacts" with the forum
state, allowing jurisdiction only when nonresident defendants engage in
"continuous and systematic" activities within the state where the court
sits. 2 2 Generally, courts have held that maintaining an Internet website
accessible to persons within the forum state is not sufficient in-state activity
to justify general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.23 In the ab-
sence of general jurisdiction, however, courts may still exercise specific
personal jurisdiction-the doctrine most often relied upon in cases requir-
ing Internet-based personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 24
2. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
Unlike general jurisdiction, specific personal jurisdiction requires a
"basic nexus" between a plaintiffs cause of action and the defendant's
contacts with the forum state. 25 Provided that such a nexus exists, courts
must examine the nature and extent of a nonresident defendant's con-
tacts with the state to determine whether they satisfy the "minimum con-
tacts" required to constitutionally justify a local court's exercise of
jurisdiction. 26
21. See Burk, supra note 2, at 1108 (describing general jurisdiction analysis).
22. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16
(1984) (providing general jurisdiction standard).
23. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("We are not prepared at this time to recognize that a State may obtain
general jurisdiction over out-of-state persons who regularly and systematically
transmit electronic signals into the State via the Internet based solely on those
transmissions."); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir.
1998) (concluding Internet activities are not substantial or systematic to justify
general jurisdiction); Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp.
2d 824, 833 (N.D. I11. 2000) (declining general jurisdiction over out-of-state web-
site operator); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122
(W.D. Pa. 1997) ("[I]f personal jurisdiction exists in this case, it must be
specific.").
24. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (providing
framework for specific personal jurisdiction). Most courts extending personal ju-
risdiction over nonresident defendants based on their Internet-based activities
have applied specific personal jurisdiction. See Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89
F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (6th Cir. 1996) (exercising specific jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendant for Internet-based activities); see also Euromarket Designs, Inc., 96 F.
Supp. 2d at 833 (same); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1127 (same); Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (same).
25. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d Cir. 2003)
(detailing nexus requirements described in Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d
361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002)).
26. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (citing Int'l
Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316) (noting requirement for constitutionally sufficient mini-
mum contacts with forum to sustain personal jurisdiction); see also U.S. CONST.
[Vol. 49: p. 931
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a. Minimum Contacts Test
The minimum contacts test requires defendants, by their actions, to
"purposefully avail" themselves of the privilege of conducting business in
the state.27 While defendants need not physically enter the state, constitu-
tional due process requires nonresident defendants to purposefully and
deliberately establish minimum contacts with the forum state before a
court can justify the exercise of jurisdiction. 28 These requirements are
designed to prevent unwary defendants from being brought under a for-
eign or out-of-state court's jurisdiction due to random or isolated contacts,
and to ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction "comports with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."29
b. Effects Test
In Calder v. Jones3 0 the Supreme Court presented an alternative to the
traditional purposeful availment test for specific personal jurisdiction.3 '
This "effects test" allows courts to extend jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants when their tortious actions, and the resultant effects, are ex-
pressly targeted at in-state plaintiffs. 3 2 The Court in Calder applied this
effects test to affirm a California court's exercise of jurisdiction over two
Florida defendants based on a libelous article they wrote in a national pub-
amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... ").
27. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (explaining purposeful
availment requirement for personal jurisdiction). The Court in Hanson explained:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the fo-
rum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.
Id.
28. See Euromarket Designs, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (citing Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. at 475). The Supreme Court summarized the challenge of expanding
personal jurisdiction in the face of technological change, noting "it is an ines-
capable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is
transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviat-
ing the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted."
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476.
29. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colum.,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984) (noting desire to avoid personal jurisdiction
based on unilateral activity of third parties); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (noting need to avoid jurisdiction based on random or atten-
uated contacts).
30. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
31. See id. at 790 ("An individual injured in California need not go to Florida
to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause
injury in California.").
32. See id. at 789 (noting Florida resident defendants "expressly aimed" their
tortious actions at California resident).
20041
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lication regarding a California resident. 33 The Court sustained jurisdic-
tion-despite a lack of substantial contacts between the defendants and
the forum state-based on the defendants' knowledge that their article
might have an injurious effect on the plaintiff in the state where she lived
and worked.3 4 Courts in subsequent cases have used the effects test to
extend jurisdiction whenever a nonresident defendant's activities (1) are
intentional; (2) are expressly and knowingly aimed at the forum state; (3)
cause harm that is primarily felt in the forum state; and (4) are known, by
the defendant, to be likely to inflict harm in the forum state. 35
B. Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
The near universal ability of the Internet to connect website owners
with website visitors around the world, without regard to geographical
boundaries, creates the potential to expose website owners to liability vir-
33. See id. at 786 (reciting facts of case). The article at issue in Calder was
written and edited in Florida, but the story concerned the California-based activity
of a California resident. See id. at 788 (describing plaintiffs connection to
California).
34. See id. at 789-90 (sustaining jurisdiction). The Court stated:
[T]he brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional dis-
tress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in Cali-
fornia. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the
harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in Cali-
fornia based on the "effects" of their Florida conduct in California.
Id. at 788-89. The Ninth Circuit has held, however, in a defamation case similar to
Calder, that jurisdiction over a Swedish resident was improper under the effects test
where the plaintiff was a corporation rather than an individual. See Core-Vent
Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying personal
jurisdiction). The Core-Vent court required corporate plaintiffs to demonstrate
both that they were headquartered in the forum and that the economic impact of
the defendant's actions was felt primarily in that state. See id. at 1487 (noting plain-
tiff did not allege effects were felt most significantly in California). Other courts,
including the Third Circuit, however, have applied the effects test from Calder
without distinguishing between corporate and individual plaintiffs. See First Am.
First, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bank Women, 802 F.2d 1511, 1517 (4th Cir. 1985) (ex-
tending personal jurisdiction under effects test for plaintiff corporation); see also
Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 837 (N.D. Ill.
2000) ("[T] he state of a company's principal place of business is where the injury
is most likely to occur. Therefore, personal jurisdiction is proper under the effects
doctrine."). The Third Circuit summarized its position on this issue, noting that it
"is questionable judicial policy to apply a different jurisdictional rule to individuals
than to corporations, to small enterprises than to large ones. To indulge in such
ad hoc determinations creates confusion where there should be certainty .... "
IMO Indus. Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 n.9 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Dollar Savings Bank v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 746 F.2d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 1984)).
35. See Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486 (summarizing effects test from Calder). The
Core-Vent court summarized the Calder effects test, noting that "personal jurisdic-
tion can be predicated on (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum
state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered-and the defendant knows is
likely to be suffered-in the forum state." Id.
936 [Vol. 49: p. 931
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tually anywhere.3 6 When website owners place information on public web-
sites, they cannot control the location of persons accessing the site or
effectively limit their sites' geographic reach.3 7 Fortunately for website
owners, personal jurisdiction analysis extends beyond questions of mere
accessibility to persons in foreign or remote jurisdictions.3 8 Because prac-
36. See Osteotech, Inc. v. GenSci Regeneration Scis., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 349,
356 (D.N.J. 1998) (declining to find personal jurisdiction based on operation of
website). "[A] finding ofjurisdiction ... based on an Internet website would mean
that there would be nationwide (indeed, worldwide) jurisdiction over anyone and
everyone who establishes an Internet website [and] .. .[s]uch nationwide jurisdic-
tion would be wholly inconsistent with traditional personal jurisdiction case law."
Id. (quoting Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 CIV. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997)). "The internet is an exemplar of recent technological
progress that tests the personal jurisdiction standard developed by International
Shoe because it is not restricted by distance or territorial boundaries." Hy Cite
Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.Com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1158 (W.D. Wis.
2004); see also HALE & DoRR LLP, U.S. Federal Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Spanish
Company Whose Web Site Is Not Purposefully Directed at the U.S., EMAIL ALERTS (Sept. 7,
2001), at www.haledorr.com/publications/pub detail.aspx?ID=1016&Type=5543
(noting practical limits to Internet-based personal jurisdiction).
37. See Burk, supra note 2, at 1112 ("Internet protocols were not designed to
facilitate geographic documentation; in general, they ignore it."). While the In-
ternet utilizes a system of addresses to identify machines in cyberspace, these ad-
dresses are logical, rather than physical, and bear little or no relationship to
geographic location. See id. at 1112-13 (noting difficulty of applying purposeful
availment rationale in cyberspace).
38. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir.
2002) (noting limitations on personal jurisdiction). The ALS Scan court noted:
[U]nder current Supreme Court jurisprudence, despite advances in tech-
nology, State judicial power over persons appears to remain limited to
persons within the State's boundaries and to those persons outside of the
State who have minimum contacts with the State such that the State's
exercise of judicial power over the person would not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Id. Courts continue to struggle with reconciling Internet technology and mini-
mum contacts required for personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring more than simply post-
ing on Internet to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state party). Merely
placing information on the Internet has been likened to placing items in the
stream of commerce-which is insufficient, by itself, to support personal jurisdic-
tion. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding national, or even worldwide, impact of creating publicly accessible web-
site insufficient to support personal jurisdiction); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Super. Ct. of Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (requiring additional con-
duct, beyond placing product into stream of commerce, for purposeful availment).
Under Asahi, a defendant must engage in additional actions towards the forum
state, such as advertising or designing the product for marketing in the forum
state, to support personal jurisdiction. See id. at 112 (noting that "[a]dditional
conduct" may be sufficient to show defendants' intent to engage in forum state's
market, such as, "designing the product for the market in the forum State, adver-
tising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to
customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who
has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State"). The court in Bensusan
similarly held that to extend personal jurisdiction in New York over a Missouri club
owner's website, it must be shown that the club owner actively sought to encourage
2004]
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tical limits are needed, courts must draw the lines to determine what, be-
yond accessibility, is necessary in order for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction in distant forums to meet with the constitutionally established
limits-only exercising jurisdiction in forums where a defendant "should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court."39
The Internet is distinct from the offline world because it operates
outside of the spatial and geographic borders that traditionally define the
limits of a court's jurisdiction. 40 Courts are accustomed to analyzing non-
physical contacts to determine whether they are purposefully directed at
the forum, however, cyberspace presents a unique challenge. 4 1 When
evaluating traditional non-physical contacts, such as making a phone call
or corresponding through the mail, it is easy to determine whether a party
intends to reach out to communicate or transact business with foreign ju-
risdictions. 42 Web contacts, however, are more difficult to conceptualize
because public Internet sites do not deliver their information in a focused
or directed manner.4 3 When a person makes information available or
New Yorkers to access the club's website or that he conducted business in New
York. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (noting that defendant's ability to foresee
that persons in remote forums would access its website was insufficient to sustain
personal jurisdiction in those forums).
39. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
40. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1371 (1996) (noting lack of terrestrial bounda-
ries in cyberspace). Due to the virtual nature of cyberspace, none of the tradi-
tional barriers that typically separate geographically remote persons apply. See id.
at 1370-71 (same). This is why "[t]he power to control activity in Cyberspace has
only the most tenuous connections to physical location." Id. at 1371.
41. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)
("U]urisdiction ... may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not
physically enter the forum State."). Personal jurisdiction analysis requires courts to
expand jurisdictional inquiry to accommodate non-physical communications, like
mail and telephone contacts. See id. (recognizing that "it is an inescapable fact of
modern commercial life that a substantial amount of commercial business is trans-
acted solely by mail and wire communication across state lines, thus obviating the
need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted"). Unlike
these types of transactions that take place in the physical world, persons con-
ducting business in cyberspace are often unaware of the other party's physical loca-
tion. See Burk, supra note 2, at 1110 (noting "veil of ignorance" in Internet
transactions).
42. See Burns & Bales, supra note 4, at 39 (noting important differences be-
tween web contacts and traditional non-physical contacts).
43. See Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting nature of Internet).
Because the Internet links together independent networks that merely
use the same data transfer protocols, it cannot be said that any single
entity or group of entities controls, or can control, the content made pub-
licly available on the Internet or limits, or can limit, the ability of others
to access public content.
Id.
Through the use of computers, corporations can now transact business
and communicate with individuals in several states simultaneously. Un-
938 [Vol. 49: p. 931
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conducts business via a public website, anyone with an Internet connec-
tion can engage in transactions with that person, regardless of geographic
boundaries or the website owner's intent.44 This phenomenon requires
courts to engage in a complex analysis to determine when Internet-based
activity gives rise to the level of purposeful availment required to justify
exercising specific personal jurisdiction. 45
like communication by mail or telephone, messages sent through com-
puters are available to the recipient and anyone else who may be
watching. Thus, while modern technology has made nationwide com-
mercial transactions simpler and more feasible, even for small businesses,
it must broaden correspondingly the permissible scope ofjurisdiction ex-
ercisable by the courts.
Cal. Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (noting effects of Internet on business transactions).
44. See Burns & Bales, supra note 4, at 39-40 (describing "spider web" nature
of web accessibility); see also Burk, supra note 2, at 1111 (highlighting difficulty of
purposeful availment analysis in cyberspace).
[I]t is difficult to assert with a straight face that the remote [Internet]
user has purposefully or knowingly availed himself of [a] particular juris-
diction's benefits.
It is similarly difficult to seriously assert that an Internet business
should "reasonably anticipate" being haled into court in a geographical
location concerning which it was ignorant, or at least indifferent, with
regard to contact.
Burk, supra note 2, at 1111.
45. See Burns & Bales, supra note 4, at 40 (describing approaches used to con-
ceptualize web contacts). The two major approaches that are applied to web con-
tacts parallel the Asahi debate over personal jurisdiction that stems from placing
products into the stream of commerce. See id. at 39-40 ("[T]he spider web ap-
proach is highly expansive and tends to mirror Justice Brennan's reasoning from
Asahi, the highway approach provides a much narrower view and tends to reflect
Justice O'Connor's reasoning from Asahi."). The broader "spider web" approach,
holding persons liable in all jurisdictions where their websites can be accessed,
parallels Justice Brennan's dissent in Asahi, arguing that placing products into the
stream of commerce is sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction in whatever juris-
dictions the product reaches. See id. at 40 (describing "spider web" approach to
Internet-based jurisdiction); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Solano
County, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("U]urisdiction pre-
mised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent
with the Due Process Clause, and [does] not require[ ] a showing of additional
conduct."). The narrower "highway approach" to web contacts requires more than
a user's unilateral contact with a website to justify jurisdiction. See Burns & Bales,
supra note 4, at 46 (describing "highway" approach). Under the highway approach
to personal jurisdiction:
[T] he operator of a Web site is jurisdictionally present in a foreign state
only if the operator has somehow 'reached out' to a person or entity in
the foreign state, such as by soliciting information from or selling a prod-
uct over the Web to a person or entity in the foreign state.
Id. It is akin to Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi, which required more
than placing products into the stream of commerce tojustify jurisdiction. See id. at
46 (noting parallels between "highway approach" and plurality opinion in Asahi);
see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (holding "[t]he placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State"). The analysis is similar to the intent require-
ment of the Calder effects test. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Great Domains, Inc., 141
2004] CASEBRIEF 939
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1. The Sliding Scale of Internet Contacts-Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc.4
6
In Zippo, a landmark case for shaping personal jurisdiction rules for
cyberspace, the Western District of Pennsylvania held that "the exercise of
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and com-
mercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the [nonres-
ident defendant's website] ." 4 7 Under the Zippo analysis, websites are
placed on a "sliding scale," based on the nature and quality of commercial
activity conducted via the Internet, to determine whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is proper.48
On one end of the Zippo sliding scale are passive websites. 4 9 These
are sites on which a defendant posts information on the web, and the in-
formation is openly accessible to parties in foreign jurisdictions.5 0 Under
F. Supp. 2d 763, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (weighing what is necessary for act of regis-
tering another's trademark as domain name to constitute intentional injury in fo-
rum where trademark owner is located). The court in Ford Motor found that
registering another's trademarks as Internet domain names alone does not show
sufficient intent to harm the trademark owners in their home forums. See id. at
776 (rejecting "argument that, merely by incorporating a famous mark into a do-
main name, the registrant assumes the risk of being subjected to jurisdiction in the
trademark owner's home forum"). The Ford Motor court required a case-by-case
assessment of whether the registration of the domain name was expressly aimed at
the trademark owner in order to support personal jurisdiction in the trademark
owner's home forum. See id. at 776 ("Concluding otherwise would shift the focus
in personal jurisdiction determinations away from the 'traditional [due process]
notions of fair play and substantial justice,' where it properly belongs and instead
create an automatic 'home-court' advantage for plaintiffs, a result not intended by
Calder.") (citations omitted).
46. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
47. Id. at 1124 (concluding that, where defendant clearly does business
through its website with forum state and claim relates to use of website, personal
jurisdiction exists). The Zippo court relied on CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996), which found sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction where a
commercial website's interactivity specifically intended interaction with residents
of the forum state. See id. (citing CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264-66).
48. See id. at 1124 (noting likelihood that personal jurisdiction is properly ex-
ercised is "directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity
that an entity conducts over the Internet").
49. See id. (categorizing websites where defendant simply posts information
that is available to users in foreign jurisdictions as "passive").
50. See, e.g., Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (finding defendant's website insufficient to support personal jurisdiction).
The website at issue in Bensusan was a "general access site, which mean[t] that it
require[d] no authentication or access code for entry, and [was] accessible to any-
one around the world who ha[d] access to the Internet." Id. at 297.
[The defendant], like numerous others, simply created a Website and
permitted anyone who could find it to access it. Creating a site, like plac-
ing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or
even worldwide-but, without more, is not an act purposefully directed at
the forum state.
Id. at 301 (referencing stream of commerce requirement from Asahi, 480 U.S. at
112).
940 [Vol. 49: p. 931
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the Zippo analysis, merely placing information on a public website is insuf-
ficient to sustain jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 5' At the other
end of the Zippo scale are sites that go beyond passively providing informa-
tion and are used to conduct business with residents of foreign jurisdic-
tions.52 Under Zippo, when websites permit people to enter into
"contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction . . . personal jurisdiction
[in that forum] is [deemed] proper. "1 53
In between these two extremes lies a range of interactive websites,
where users can exchange all manner of information with a host computer
in a foreign state. 54 In these cases, the Zippo court held that the exercise
51. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (characterizing passive websites as "outer
limits of the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the Internet"). While the
Zippo approach to denying personal jurisdiction based on a passive website has
been adopted by many other jurisdictions, it is not universally accepted. See, e.g.,
Inset Sys. Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (rea-
soning that posting information on website constitutes purposeful doing of busi-
ness in forum where information is accessed). The expansive approach to
extending personal jurisdiction to every location where a website is accessed has
been described as a "spider web" approach. See Burns & Bales, supra note 4, at 40
(describing "spider web" approach to personal jurisdiction). For a discussion of
the "spider web" approach to Internet based personal jurisdiction, see supra note
45 and accompanying text.
52. See Zippo, 952 F.. Supp. at 1125-26 (characterizing case as determining
whether conducting electronic commerce with Pennsylvania residents meets pur-
poseful availment requirement).
53. Id. at 1124. In Zippo, the defendant intentionally issued passwords to its
Internet news service to persons in Pennsylvania, knowing that this would result in
business relationships with Pennsylvania residents. See id. at 1126 (describing basis
for jurisdiction). In finding jurisdiction proper, the Zippo court noted:
When a defendant makes a conscious choice to conduct business with the
residents of a forum state, "it has clear notice that it is subject to suit
there."... If [the defendant] had not wanted to be amenable tojurisdic-
tion in Pennsylvania .... it could have chosen not to sell its services to
Pennsylvania residents.
Id. at 1126-27 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)).
54. See id. at 1124 (describing sliding scale to determine personal jurisdic-
tion). The example presented by the Zippo court of a website occupying the mid-
dle ground of the sliding scale was Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Mo. 1996). See id. at 1124 (describing website at issue in Maritz). In Maritz, a
California-based website was used to advertise an upcoming Internet advertising
service. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330 (describing plans for forthcoming Internet
advertising business). While the service was not yet operational, the site en-
couraged users to add their addresses to a mailing list to receive updates about the
service and sent email responses to persons signing up for its mailing list. See id.
(stating that "the website 'invites Missourians to put their names on CyberGold's
mailing list and get up-to-date information about the company and its forthcoming
Internet service"'). The Maritz court found that because the defendant operated a
website with the purpose and intent to develop a mailing list of Internet users-
including residents of Missouri-for its service, it was more than a passive website.
See id. at 1333 (analyzing nature of defendant's contacts with forum). The court
determined that by indiscriminately responding to all Internet users accessing its
site, Cybergold had consciously decided to transmit advertising information glob-
ally, including to Missouri residents. See id. (stating that "[a]lthough Cybergold
11
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of jurisdiction is properly determined on a case-by-case basis, focusing on
the interactivity and exchange of commercial information that occurs on
the website. 55 Although not universally adopted by all jurisdictions, the
Zippo model has been highly influential in providing a framework for ana-
lyzing websites for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction. 56
2. Beyond the Zippo Scale-Examining Intent and Effects
The Zippo scale focuses judicial analysis on defendants' websites and
the nature of the defendants' Internet-based contacts with the forum as a
basis for jurisdiction. 57 A website's placement on the Zippo scale, however,
need not be determinative for personal jurisdiction. 58 The grounds for
personal jurisdiction stemming from the operation of a website often ex-
tend beyond an examination of Internet-based contacts. 59 Several courts,
while acknowledging the usefulness of the Zippo framework in analyzing
online contacts, have moved beyond the Zippo scale by scrutinizing both
online and offline contacts in a broader context to determine whether a
defendant's Internet-based activities were intentionally directed at the state. 60
characterizes its activity as merely maintaining a 'passive website,' its intent is to
reach all internet users, regardless of geographic location"). This was deemed suf-
ficient to grant personal jurisdiction in Missouri over the California-based defen-
dant. See id. at 1334 (concluding that court has personal jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendant).
55. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (discussing standard for websites with inter-
mediate level of interactivity).
56. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("adopting and adapting the Zippo model"); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen
Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (evaluating website contacts on
Zippo sliding scale); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)
(applying Zippo sliding scale); Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196
F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Zippo standard for passive websites in de-
nying basis for personal jurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d
414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997) (using Zippo scale to establish personal jurisdiction from
website activities); Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.Com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp.
2d 1154, 1159-60 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (noting influence of Zippo test); Watchworks,
Inc. v. Total Time, Inc., No. 01 CIV. 5711, 2002 WL 424631, at *5 (N.D. Ill. March
19, 2002) (placing defendant's website on Zippo sliding scale); Weber v. Jolly Ho-
tels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) (applying Zippo framework to refuse per-
sonaljurisdiction over passive website owner). Contra Hy Cite Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d
at 1161 (declining to adopt Zippo as substitute for minimum contact test).
57. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26 (analyzing defendant's Internet-based
electronic commerce activities).
58. See, e.g., GTE New Media Serv., Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343,
1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding interactive commercial website insufficient to
support jurisdiction if not aimed at residents in forum state); Panavision Int'l, L.P.
v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding passive website capable
of supporting jurisdiction when directed at forum state).
59. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d. 446, 453 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting need to analyze non-Internet contacts in Internet-based personal jurisdic-
tion cases).
60. See Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1322 (stating requirements for Internet-
based personal jurisdiction). The Ninth Circuit, in Panavision International, noted
that there should be "something more" to "indicate that the defendant purpose-
[Vol. 49: p. 931
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This intent, rather than the interactivity of a defendant's website, becomes
the dispositive factor in deciding whether the purposeful availment re-
quirement for personal jurisdiction has been met.6 1
a. Finding Intent and Effects in Passive Websites-Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen
62
By moving beyond the Zippo website analysis, a defendant's intent can
sometimes support jurisdiction over the owner of even the most passive
website. 63 In Panavision International, the Ninth Circuit approved a Cali-
fornia court's jurisdiction over an Illinois website operator based on the
intended effects of the operator's Internet-based activities rather than the
interactivity of its website. 64 When the plaintiff, Panavision International,
attempted to register the Internet domain name www.panavision.com in
connection with its line of camera equipment, it discovered the domain
name was already registered to the defendant. 65 The plaintiff sued the
defendant because it owned the trademark to the Panavision name, which
the defendant had already used to establish a website with the
www.panavision.com domain name. 66 Although the defendant's website
was passive in that it simply displayed photographs without any interactive
features, the Panavision International court sustained jurisdiction under the
effects test set forth in Calder.
67
Finding the passive nature of the defendant's website insufficient to
support jurisdiction under the Zippo scale, the Panavision International
court directed its inquiry to the defendant's business practices. 68 Offline
evidence regarding the defendant's business practices led the court to
conclude that the defendant purposefully registered Internet domain
names corresponding to other parties' trademarks in order to pressure the
trademark owners into buying the domain names back from him. 69 Be-
fully (albeit electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum
state." Id. at 1321 (quoting Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 418).
61. See id. at 1322 (basing personal jurisdiction from Internet activities on de-
fendant's intent rather than on interactivity of website).
62. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
63. See, e.g., id. at 1322 (affirming California court's jurisdiction over Florida
resident defendant based on effects of passive website).
64. See id. at 1318 (affirming district court's decision).
65. See id. at 1319 (describing facts of case).
66. See id. (describing source of plaintiff's claim).
67. See id. at 1321 (noting that, without something more to indicate that de-
fendants directed their activity, even electronically, towards forum,jurisdiction was
not proper). The defendant's website, www.panavision.com, displayed photo-
graphs of the City of Pana, Illinois; it had no additional features to allow interac-
tion or transaction of business via the site. See id. at 1319 (describing facts of case).
68. See id. at 1322 ("ISlimply registering someone else's trademark as a do-
main name and posting a website on the Internet is not sufficient to subject a party
domiciled in one state to jurisdiction in another.").
69. See id. at 1321 (citing Calder v.Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) as "establishing
an 'effects test' for intentional action aimed at the forum state"). The Panavision
2004]
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cause the court found that the defendant directed his "cyber squatting"
activities at the plaintiff (as the legitimate trademark owner) and knew the
plaintiff was based in California, the court concluded that whatever dam-
ages resulted from the defendant's Internet activities were knowingly in-
flicted in California.7 0 The Panavision International court found this
sufficient, under the effects test, to satisfy the purposeful availment re-
quirement necessary to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the out-
of-state defendant.
7 1
b. Finding Intent and Effects in Active Websites-Euromarket Designs,
Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd.
72
Express intent requirements can also undermine defendants' efforts
to limit their online contacts in order to escape jurisdiction in foreign
courts.73 In Euromarket Designs, a copycat marketing case, the Northern
District of Illinois exercised jurisdiction over an Irish company on the basis
of its commercial website activities. 7 4 The plaintiff, an Illinois company,
owned the trademark to the name Crate & Barrel and operated a commer-
International court noted correspondence from the defendant offering to sell the
plaintiff the panavision.com domain and to agree not to acquire other Internet
addresses corresponding with Panavision Corporation trademarks for $13,000. See
id. at 1319 (noting defendant's settlement offer). The defendant had also regis-
tered domain names corresponding with trademarks for other companies, such as
Delta Airlines and Eddie Bauer, and offered to sell them to the trademark owners.
See id. (noting defendant's business practice of cyber squatting). For example, the
defendant had previously attempted to sell americanstandard.com to American
Standard, Inc. for $15,000. See id. (depicting previous instances of cyber squatting
on behalf of defendant).
70. See id. at 1321 (noting nature of harm to Panavision from defendant's
actions). Even though Panavision was a Delaware limited partnership, it, and the
bulk of the motion picture and television industry, was located in California. See id.
(explaining corporate structure of Panavision). The court used the public knowl-
edge of Panavision's corporate structure to infer that the defendant knew that the
likely harm from his Internet activities would be felt in California. See id. (conclud-
ing that defendant had knowledge of location of effects of cyber squatting). The
Panavision International court also cited Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Balti-
more Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994), as a similar effects-based juris-
diction case. See id. at 1321 (using effects test to find jurisdiction based on
defendant's knowledge). In Indianapolis Colts, Inc., the Indianapolis Colts profes-
sional football team brought suit in Indiana against a Canadian league football
team named the "Baltimore CFL Colts" for trademark infringement. See Indianapo-
lis Colts, Inc., 34 F.3d at 411. Because the Indianapolis Colts used their trademarks
in Indiana, and any infringement of these marks would knowingly be felt there,
the Seventh Circuit held that the Canadian team was subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in an Indiana court. See id. (finding defendant's knowledge of location of
effects of trademark infringement as basis for jurisdiction).
71. See Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1322 (finding defendant's conduct met
"something more" requirement for personal jurisdiction).
72. 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
73. See, e.g., id. at 835 (extending jurisdiction based on defendant's website
activities).
74. See id. at 838 (finding sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to exercise
jurisdiction).
944 [Vol. 49: p. 931
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cial website at www.crateandbarrel.com. 75 The defendant, an Irish com-
pany, operated a competing website at the domain www.crateandbarrel-
ie.com, where it sold housewares and furniture similar to the plaintiffs
merchandise, also under the name Crate & Barrel. 76 Although visitors,
including Illinois residents, could browse the defendant's
www.crateandbarrel-ie.com website and purchase merchandise online, the
defendant took specific steps to limit the reach of its Internet contacts to
the Republic of Ireland.17 These steps included limiting the shipment of
products ordered from the site to addresses within Ireland and pricing
these products only in Irish pounds. 78 Despite these steps, the Euromarket
Designs court found jurisdiction proper under both the effects and mini-
mum contacts tests.
79
Like the court in Panavision International, the Euromarket Designs court
looked to the defendant's intent behind its Internet-based activities.80
The court found that the defendant's actions, including registering a do-
main name corresponding to the plaintiff's trademark and using that
trademark on its website and merchandise, were sufficient to demonstrate
that it knowingly caused injury to the plaintiff at its Illinois headquarters. 8 1
The court also looked at the defendant's offline activities, including its
relationships with the plaintiff's Illinois suppliers and attendance at trade
75. See id. at 828 (describing plaintiff's business).
76. See id. at 828-29 (describing defendant's business).
77. See id. at 829 (describing defendant's website).
78. See id. at 838 (finding defendant's website constituted "doing business" via
Internet under Zippo scale). The limitations the defendant in Euromarket Designs
placed on its site to limit its impact to Ireland, however, could be seen as minimal.
See id. at 829 (describing defendant's website activities). Until the commencement
of the lawsuit, pricing on the site was in United States dollars, and the pages where
users entered shipping and billing information had fields that were "clearly organ-
ized for a United States-format address." See id. ("There is an entry window for the
shipping/billing city, state and zip code-a format unique to the United States.").
After the commencement of the lawsuit, the defendant added a statement "Goods
Sold Only in the Republic of Ireland" and changed the valuation of its goods to
Irish pounds. See id. (citing remedial measures taken following start of lawsuit).
79. See id. at 835 (finding jurisdiction proper). The Euromarket Designs court
noted that, "[iun this case, Defendant's activities demonstrate that it deliberately
established minimum contacts with Illinois and purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in this forum under both the traditional effects
doctrine and the sliding scale analysis developed for Internet activities in trade-
mark infringement suits." Id.
80. Id. at 836 (justifying jurisdiction under effects test).
[The defendant's] alleged tortious actions establish personal jurisdiction
over Limited under the effects doctrine for three reasons: 1) if the Crate
& Barrel's trademark has been infringed, the injury will be felt mainly in
Illinois; 2) Limited intentionally and purposefully directed its actions to-
ward Illinois and Crate & Barrel, an Illinois corporation, allegedly causing
harm to Crate & Barrel in Illinois; and 3) Limited knew that harm would
likely be suffered in Illinois.
Id.
81. See id. (citing parallels to Panavision International for evidence of directed
activity towards forum state).
2004]
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shows in the state, as additional evidence of the defendant's intent to copy
the plaintiffs trademarks-supporting an exercise of jurisdiction under
the effects test.
8 2
When analyzing whether purposeful availment existed, the Euromarket
Designs court noted that the defendant's website was used for conducting
business over the Internet.8 3 The www.crateandbarrel-ie.com site actively
solicited visitors, including residents of Illinois, to browse and purchase
products.8 4 The court, applying the Zippo scale, deemed this level of web-
site interactivity sufficient to meet the purposeful availment requirement
to sustain personal jurisdiction.8 5 The Euromarket Designs court, however,
bolstered its jurisdictional finding by also examining the defendant's non-
Internet activities, like its use of Illinois suppliers, its advertisements in
European publications that were circulated in the United States (includ-
ing Illinois) and documented incidents of billing and collecting revenues
from Illinois residents. 8 6 This offline activity, the court concluded, was
indicative of the defendant's intent behind its Internet activities and
demonstrated its purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business
in Illinois.
8 7
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT APPROACH TO INTERNET-BASED PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN Toys "R" Us, INC. V. STEP Two, S.A.
In a case of first impression, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Toys "R" Us, addressed the question of when the operation of an Internet
82. See id. (noting non-Internet activities also intentionally directed toward
plaintiff in Illinois).
83. See id. at 838 (finding defendant's website allows it to conduct business
and enter into contracts with residents of foreign jurisdictions).
84. See id. (describing defendant's website).
[Defendant] purposefully and deliberately designed and now maintains a
website with a high level of interactivity, enabling customers to browse
through an online catalog and place orders via the Internet. The website
actively solicits all users, including residents of Illinois, to purchase goods.
Defendant clearly is doing business over the website.
Id. The plaintiff presented evidence of an Illinois resident who was able to buy
merchandise from the defendant's website by entering an order from a computer
located in Illinois, using an Illinois billing address, and paying for the merchandise
with a credit card registered in Illinois-even though the goods were shipped to an
address in Ireland. See id. at 832 (stating that sale of goods and shipment to Ire-
land constituted "sale and transportation of goods in commerce"). The Euromarket
Designs court was not persuaded by the defendant's argument that it was not con-
ducting business in Illinois when it limited shipment of goods to the Republic of
Ireland. See id. (noting that defendant entered into sales contract with, and col-
lected revenue from, Illinois residents). The fact that the defendant billed, col-
lected revenues and recorded sales on goods ordered from Illinois was sufficient to
meet the interactivity requirement under Zippo. See id. (stating that sales and col-
lection of revenue are essential parts of definition of commerce).
85. See id. at 838 (applying Zippo scale to defendant's website).
86. See id. (noting non-Internet contacts with forum).
87. See id. (finding purposeful availment).
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website is sufficient to subject a nonresident defendant to personal juris-
diction.8 8 The court considered the role of evidence, both online and
offline, in its personal jurisdiction analysis to show that a defendant had
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the
state through the use of a commercial website.8 9
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In February 2001, Toys "R" Us filed suit in the District Court of New
Jersey, alleging that Step Two, S.A. ("Step Two"), a Spanish company, used
its website to engage in trademark infringement and unlawful cyber squat-
ting.90 Among its allegations, Toys "R" Us claimed that Step Two (1) cop-
ied the Imaginarium concept from them; (2) sold a mix of toys identical
to those sold by Toys "R" Us under the Imaginarium brand; (3) mimicked
Toys "R" Us's marketing plans and practices in development of the
Imaginarium brand; and (4) tried to expand its global business, including
business in the United States, by operating websites that capitalized on the
goodwill and reputation of Toys "R" Us's Imaginarium brand.9 1
Step Two is a Spanish company that, at the time of the suit, owned or
franchised more than 160 retail toy stores in ten non-U.S. countries under
the name "Imaginarium." 92 Beginning in 1991, the company registered
the Imaginarium trademark in several countries, but never registered this
trademark in the United States. 9 3 Toys "R" Us is a New Jersey-based com-
88. See PITNEY HARDIN, Internet Jurisdiction - The Third Circuit Clarifies the Stan-
dard by Which Website Owners Can Be Subject to Personal Jurisdiction, ALERT, (Jan. 30,
2003), at http://www.pitneyhardin.com/news/litigation013003.html (summariz-
ing court's decision). The Toys "R" Us court summarized the issue before it as
follows:
The precise question raised by this case is whether the operation of a
commercially interactive website accessible in the forum state is sufficient
to support specific personal jurisdiction, or whether there must be addi-
tional evidence that the defendant has "purposefully availed" itself of the
privilege of engaging in activity in that state.
Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d Cir. 2003).
89. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 451 (articulating standard for when personal
jurisdiction can be based on defendant's operation of website). The Toys "R" Us
court found that evidence of intentional interaction with the forum state is needed
to demonstrate that a defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of do-
ing business with the forum state. See id. at 452 (stating requirements for pur-
poseful availment). "If a defendant website operator intentionally targets the site
to the forum state, and/or knowingly conducts business with forum state residents
via the site, then the 'purposeful availment' requirement is satisfied." Id.
90. See Intellectual Property Professional Information Center, Without Pur-
poseful Availment, Operation of Interactive Site Not Enough for Jurisdiction, 8 ELECTRONIC
COM. & L. REP. No. 5 (Feb. 5, 2003), at http://ipcenter.bna.com/pic2/ip.nsf/id/
BNAP-5JAJJC?OpenDocument (describing Toys "R" Us's allegations).
91. Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 456-57 (outlining allegations that supported Toys
"R" Us's claim for jurisdictional discovery).
92. See HALE & DORR LLP, supra note 36 (summarizing facts of case).
93. See id. (noting Step Two's lack of contacts with United States). "[Step
Two] first registered the Imaginarium mark in Spain in 1991, and it opened its first
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pany that acquired Imaginarium Toy Centers Inc., a maker of educational
toys and games, in 1999. 9 4 Imaginarium Toy Centers had marketed toys
under the Imaginarium name since 1985 and registered the Imaginarium
trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark office in 1989. 9 5 At the
time of the lawsuit, Toys "R" Us operated thirty-seven stand-alone
Imaginarium stores as well as Imaginarium-branded shops within 175 of its
Toys "R" Us stores throughout the United States. 96 Both Toys "R" Us's
and Step Two's Imaginarium stores employed a similarly distinctive ap-
pearance, and both companies sold similar merchandise under the
Imaginarium brand.9
7
In 1995, four years before being acquired by Toys "R" Us,
Imaginarium Toy Centers registered the domain name imaginarium.com
and began selling its merchandise over the Internet.98 The following year,
Step Two began its own Spanish-language website, imaginarium.es, featur-
ing products from its European stores.9 9 At the time of the lawsuit, Step
Two operated multiple Imaginarium-branded websites. 10 0
Imaginarium store in the Spanish city of Zaragoza in November 1992." Shannon
P. Duffy, Web Activity Gives Plaintiff Chance for Jurisdictional Discovery, LAW.COM (Jan.
28, 2003), at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1043457920839 (summarizing
Step Two's business practices).
94. See Duffy, supra note 93 (highlighting Toys "R" Us's interest in
Imaginarium trademark).
95. See id. (noting U.S. history of Imaginarium trademark).
96. See id. (noting use of Imaginarium brand). In November 2003, Toys "R"
Us announced that it was closing its thirty-six free-standing Imaginarium stores. See
Toys "R" Us to Shutter Kids "R" Us, Imaginarium Stores, L.A. Bus. (Nov. 18, 2003), at
http://osangeles.bizjournals.com/losangeles/stories/2003/11/17/dailyl3.html
(outlining Toys "R" Us' future plans for Imaginarium stores).
97. See BAZERMAN & DRANGEL, P.C., U.S. Intellectual Property and New Media Law
Update, Vol. VII, Issue II (Mar. 4, 2003), at http://www.ipcounselors.com/200303
04.html (noting similarities between Step Two and Toys "R" Us's use of
Imaginarium brand).
98. See Duffy, supra note 93 (summarizing history of case).
99. See id. (describing Step Two's online use of Imaginarium brand). Step
Two also registered multiple other Imaginarium-branded domain names. See id.
(noting use of other Imaginarium-branded domains such as imaginari-
umworld.com, imaginarium-world.com, imaginariumnet.com, imaginariumnet.net
and imaginariumnet.org). Step Two began offering products for sale via the web
in November 2000. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 449 n.1
(3d Cir. 2003) (noting that before November 2000, products were advertised but
not sold online).
100. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 459-50 (describing management of Step
Two's myriad websites). Domain names are identified by a "top-level domain"
("TLD"). See ICANN, Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), at http://www.icann.org/tlds
(last visited May 13, 2004) (describing domain name standards). There are three
public "generic" TLDs that are used globally without restriction: .com, .net and
.org. See id. (noting that other TLDs have limited purposes). TLDs with two letters
(such as .de (Germany), .us (United States), .jp (Japan), etc.) have been estab-
lished for over 240 countries and territories to create "country code" TLDs, which
are managed by local policies of the country or territory involved. See id. (noting
that designated managers operate TLDs in accordance with economic, cultural,
linguistic and legal circumstances of country or territory involved). Step Two
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Step Two did not maintain any stores, offices, accounts or employ any
persons within the United States. 10 1 The company also claimed that it
made no effort to advertise or conduct sales in the United States. 10 2 While
four of Step Two's Imaginarium-branded websites were interactive, permit-
ting online purchases, these sites contained multiple features to discour-
age, if not prevent, Internet sales to the United States. 0 3 These features
included pricing products only in Spanish pesetas or Euros, offering ship-
ment of goods ordered from these sites only to addresses in Spain and
exclusively using the Spanish language on its websites.10 4
Despite these hurdles, Step Two's websites were still accessible to con-
sumers around the world, and it was possible for American consumers to
purchase items from them.10 5 Prior to the lawsuit, Toys "R" Us initiated
purchases from two of Step Two's Imaginarium-branded websites.1
0 6
These purchases were made by New Jersey residents utilizing credit cards
maintained Imaginarium-branded websites employing both generic and country
code domain names. See Brief of Appellees, Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318
F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003) (No. 01-3390), available at 2002 WL 32129308, at *11 (out-
lining Step Two's global website presence). In addition to the domain
imaginarium.es (whose top level domain ".es" stands for Espafia (Spain)), Step
Two maintained multiple "universal" domains, including imaginariumworld.com,
imaginarium world.com, imaginariumnet.com, imaginariumnet.net and
imaginariumnet.org. See id. (listing Imaginarium-branded domain names). In ad-
dition to the six domain names at issue in the suit, Step Two also maintained a
number of other country code domains around the world, including imaginarium.
com.co (Columbia), imaginarium.com.cr (Costa Rica), imaginarium.cu (Cuba),
imaginarium.com.gt (Guatemala), imaginarium.hn (Honduras), imaginarium.lv
(Letonia), imaginarium.com.ni (Nicaragua), imaginaium.com.pe (Peru),
imaginarium.com.uy (Uruguay), imaginarium.com.ro (Romania), imaginanium.sv
(El Salvador), imaginarium.pt (Portugal), imaginaium.com.do (Dominican Re-
public), imaginarium.co.il (Israel), imaginariumworld.pl (Poland) and
imaginarumworld.dk (Denmark). See id. at *11 n.5 (noting global reach of Step
Two's websites).
101. See PITNEY HARDIN, supra note 88 (noting Step Two's seeming absence of
jurisdictional contacts within United States).
102. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 449 (noting Step Two's claim that it directed
no advertising at United States customers).
103. See id. at 450 (describing Step Two's website offerings).
104. See id. (describing Step Two's Imaginarium-branded websites). Step
Two's Imaginaium websites provided a contact phone number in Spain but did
not include the country code that would be needed in order for a caller to access
the number from outside Spain. See id. (noting features of Step Two's
Imaginarium-branded websites designed to limit their reach to Spain). The site
also contained a voluntary registration form, which was designed to accommodate
only Spanish addresses (containing pull-down menus of Spanish provinces and
lacking proper fields to accommodate U.S. addresses). See id. (same).
105. See PrTNEY HARDIN, supra note 88 (describing background of case).
106. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 450 (describing evidence of U.S. purchases
from Step Two's websites). The purchases were initiated by Toys "R" Us and made
by an employee of Toys "R" Us and an employee of its law firm. See id. (describing
New Jersey-based purchases from Step Two's websites).
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drawn on U.S. banks for payment. 107 While the website orders were
shipped to an address in Spain, the purchased merchandise was subse-
quently forwarded to Toys "R" Us's NewJersey offices. 108 After purchasing
the items, Step Two sent confirmation emails to the buyers' New Jersey
computers and a login and password to access Step Two's online newslet-
ter, "Club Imaginarium," which could be accessed via the Internet from
the buyers' computers in New Jersey. 109
On July 31, 2001, the district court dismissed the action on the
grounds that the court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Step
Two. 110 Based on an examination of Step Two's websites, the district
court held that it would "turn the law of personal jurisdiction on its head,
if you look carefully at this website and decide that it is designed to get
U.S. buyers.""' Toys "R" Us also made numerous discovery requests to
examine Step Two's business plans, supplier contracts and other internal
documents in an effort to further investigate Step Two's alleged mimicry
of Toys "R" Us's Imaginarium brand and the known effects of these activi-
ties in New Jersey.11 2 The court denied these requests, finding that they
"had no relationship to the website activities of Step Two, which was the
only focus of Toy's claim that jurisdiction existed. ' 13 On August 28,
2001, Toys "R" Us filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit." 14
107. See id. (describing affidavit from Toys "R" Us outlining New Jersey
purchases orchestrated from Step Two). Both persons accessed Step Two's web-
sites, imaginariumworld.com and imaginariumworld.es, from New Jersey to make
their purchases. See id. (same).
108. See id. (describing Toys "R" Us's claim that Step Two's websites were ca-
pable of accommodating sales in New Jersey). The purchased items were shipped
to a Toys "R" Us employee located in Madrid, Spain who then forwarded the mer-
chandise to Toys "R" Us's New Jersey offices. See id. (same).
109. See id. at 450 (noting additional electronic contacts between Step Two's
websites and New Jersey). One of the purchasers also exchanged emails (sent
from her New Jersey location) with a Step Two employee in Spain about her
purchase. See id. (same). Other than these two sales, there was no record of U.S.-
based purchases from Step Two's websites, but the company only kept records of
the shipping addresses of its customers, not their residential addresses because
such information is not apparent from an email address. See id. at 451 (noting
Step Two's claim that it had no records of online purchases from New Jersey).
110. See id. (reviewing district court's holding).
111. Brief of Appellees, supra note 100, at *8 (quoting district court's deci-
sion). In denying jurisdiction over Step Two, the district court noted that the de-
fendant's website was not a part of a stream of commerce directed at New Jersey,
was in a foreign language, offered terms for sale in Spanish currency and did not
offer shipment of products to the United States. See id. at *7 (describing district
court's jurisdictional review).
112. See Brief for Appellant, Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446
(3d Cir. 2003) (No. 01-3390), available at 2002 WL 32129310, at *17-18 (arguing
that district court gave insufficient weight to Step Two's intentional copying of
Toys "R" Us's trademarks, selection of domain names, etc. and impact of these
actions felt in New Jersey).
113. Brief of Appellees, supra note 100, at *8 (citing district court's decision).
114. See id. at *2 (detailing procedural history).
950 [Vol. 49: p. 931
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B. The Third Circuit's Analysis
The Third Circuit departed from the "straight" application of the
Zippo sliding scale that other courts have applied to Internet-basedjurisdic-
tion.1 15 Rather than using website interactivity as a litmus test for personal
jurisdiction-never extending jurisdiction for passive sites, while always ex-
tending it for commercially interactive sites-the Toys "R" Us court looked
beyond the interactivity of a defendant's website, making the intent be-
hind the defendant's contacts with the state the determinative factor in
exercising, or declining to exercise, jurisdiction. 1 6 Consistent with the
emerging trend in other circuits, the court held that in order to satisfy the
purposeful availment requirement, the plaintiff must offer evidence of the
defendant's intentional interaction with the forum, regardless of the level
of interactivity of the defendant's website.
1 1 7
115. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 453 (outlining requirements for purposeful
availment via commercial website operation). In Toys "R" Us, the Third Circuit
termed the ruling in Zippo "a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction
based upon the operation of an Internet [website]." Id. at 452. While the Toys "R"
Us court described Zippo as implicitly requiring evidence of intent by the defendant
to conduct activity within the forum state, some courts have interpreted Zippo more
mechanically. See id. at 454 (noting Zippo "underscored the intentional nature of
the defendant's conduct vis-A-vis the forum state"). "Under Zippo, a defendant op-
erating a fully interactive [website] accessible in the forum state almost automati-
cally was subject to jurisdiction in any state where the site could be accessed. By
contrast, an entirely passive site was deemed insufficient by Zippo to justify exercise
of personal jurisdiction." See MITCHELL SILBERG & KNuPP LLP, Intellectual Property
& Technology Newsletter, Apr. 2003, at http://www.msk.com/download-files/
IPTechIssue9B.pdf (describing "straight Zippo analysis"). Some commentators
have derided courts' strict adherence to the Zippo scale as an "almost mechanical
reliance on an analysis of the interactivity or passivity of a [website]." Id.; see also,
e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.Com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1159
(W.D. Wis. 2004) (describing Zippo's sliding scale).
On one end of the spectrum are defendants that "clearly" conduct busi-
ness over the internet .... At this end, personal jurisdiction is proper. At
the opposite end of the spectrum are defendants whose websites are "pas-
sive". . . . Whether personal jurisdiction should be asserted over defend-
ants falling into th[e] middle ground depends on the "level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the Website."
Hy Cite Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
116. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 452 (noting Zippo court's reliance on Com-
puServe in finding personal jurisdiction proper when commercial website's interac-
tivity reflects specific intent to interact with residents of forum state).
117. See id. at 451-52 (noting how other circuits expressly adopted intent re-
quirements when evaluating Internet-based personal jurisdiction). The Zippo
court noted the intentional nature of that defendant's conduct of doing business
in Pennsylvania based on the interactivity of that defendant's website as supporting
jurisdiction. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding defendant's contacts with state not "fortuitous" or "coin-
cidental"). In Zippo, the defendant knowingly issued passwords to Pennsylvania
residents, intending to develop business relationships with in-state residents. See
id. at 1126 (describing basis for jurisdiction). In determining that jurisdiction was
proper, the Zippo court stated:
2004]
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1. Evidence of a Defendant's Intent, Rather Than Interactivity of Its Website,
Is the Proper Focus for Analyzing Internet-Based Contacts in Personal
Jurisdiction Analysis
Agreeing with the lower court, the Third Circuit held that, based on
the facts presented, Toys "R" Us failed to show the purposeful availment
required to extend personal jurisdiction over Step Two.1 18 Noting that
the design of Step Two's websites did not readily accommodate American
visitors, the court concluded that these websites, "while commercial and
interactive, [did] not appear to have been designed or intended to reach
customers in NewJersey." 1 9 Further concurring with the district court's
analysis, the Third Circuit also disregarded the two Internet sales and con-
firmation emails that Toys "R" Us arranged from Step Two's websites as
trivial contacts that were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over
Step Two. ' 20
2. Analyzing a Defendant's Intent Behind Its Internet-Based Contacts with a
Forum Requires a Comprehensive Case-by-Case Inquiry into Online
and Offline Activities
While the Third Circuit concurred with the majority of the district
court's analysis, it found that the lower court was too quick to deny Toys
When a defendant makes a conscious choice to conduct business with the
residents of a forum state, "it has clear notice that it is subject to suit
there."... If [the defendant] had not wanted to be amenable tojurisdic-
tion in Pennsylvania .... it could have chosen not to sell its services to
Pennsylvania residents.
Id. at 1126-27 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)).
118. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 454 (finding defendant failed to satisfy pur-
poseful availment requirement).
119. Id. (examining Step Two's website activities). The Toys "R" Us court
noted that Step Two's websites were entirely in Spanish, merchandise was priced
only in Euros and could be shipped only to addresses in Spain and, most impor-
tantly, none of the areas of the site that allowed address entry were designed to
accommodate U.S. addresses. See id. (describing evidence suggesting Step Two's
websites were targeting New Jersey residents as "inconclusive" and
"circumstantial").
120. See id. at 455-56 (addressing additional grounds for jurisdiction
presented by Toys "R" Us). The Toys "R" Us court characterized the two sales to
New Jersey consumers orchestrated by Toys "R" Us as the type of "'fortuitous,'
'random,' and 'attenuated' contacts that the Supreme Court has held insufficient
to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at 455 (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)) (noting that non-Internet contacts may pro-
vide "something more" needed to properly exercise jurisdiction). The court simi-
larly noted that the electronic newsletters and other electronic correspondence
could not form a basis for personal jurisdiction unless they demonstrated pur-
poseful availment. See id. at 455 (citing Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d
717, 729 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that an Internet site and two emails do not con-
stitute purposeful availment)); see also Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542
(D.N.J. 2002) (noting minimal email correspondence, by itself or in conjunction
with single Internet purchase, does not constitute minimum contacts with forum).
952
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"R" Us's request for additional discovery, noting that the lower court's "un-
wavering focus on the website precluded consideration of other Internet
and non-Internet contacts which ...might bring Step Two within our
jurisdiction." 12 1 Because Toys "R" Us presented non-frivolous allegations
that Step Two engaged in copycat marketing efforts, the Third Circuit
held that it would be reasonable to allow more detailed discovery into Step
Two's business plans, thereby permitting further investigation into
whether Step Two directed its business activities (including, but not lim-
ited to, its website) at New Jersey and the United States. 122 Information
regarding both Internet and non-Internet activities and contacts, the court
found, "would speak to an essential element of the personal jurisdiction
calculus."1 2
3
The Third Circuit's rationale in Toys "R" Us paralleled the Supreme
Court's plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court of
Solano County.1 24 Just as placing a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not sufficient to justify jurisdiction in remote forums, cre-
ating a website, even one with global reach and interactivity, does not nec-
essarily indicate the required intent to purposefully avail oneself of the
privilege of doing business in a foreign jurisdiction.1 25 Consistent with
similar rulings in the Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit
placed the Zippo scale into a more holistic context by expressly requiring a
website, regardless of its level of interactivity, to be intentionally or know-
ingly directed at the forum state in order to support jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants. 12 6 Finding insufficient inquiry by the lower court
121. Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 456 ("[A]ny information regarding Step Two's
intent vis-a-vis its Internet business and regarding other related contacts is known
by Step Two, and can be learned by Toys only through discovery.").
122. See id. at 457 (supporting Toys "R" Us's request for jurisdictional discov-
ery). The Toys "R" Us court noted, as an example, that Step Two purchased some
merchandise for its Imaginarium stores and websites from U.S. vendors, and that
further discovery into these relationships and activities with U.S. vendors may shed
light on Step Two's intentions. See id. (noting district court's error in denying Toys
"R" Us jurisdictional discovery). The court characterized Toys "R" Us's request for
jurisdictional discovery as "specific, non-frivolous, and a logical follow-up based on
the information known to Toys." Id. at 458 (analyzing lower court's ruling on Toys
"R" Us's jurisdictional discovery request).
123. Id. at 457 (noting district court should have investigated possible exis-
tence of "something else" needed to exercise personal jurisdiction).
124. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
125. See id. at 102 (requiring additional conduct, beyond placing product into
stream of commerce, for purposeful availment). Under Asahi, a defendant must
engage in additional actions towards the forum state, such as advertising in, or
designing the product for marketing in, the forum state to support personal juris-
diction. See id. at 112 (noting due process requirements for personal jurisdiction).
The Third Circuit similarly looked for specific findings of the defendant's intent to
purposefully direct its activity towards the forum state. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at
453 (citing other circuits requiring express evidence of defendant's intent to sup-
port jurisdiction).
126. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 454 (requiring evidence that defendant
targeted its website at in-state residents for purposeful availment); see also ALS Scan
2004]
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into the intent behind the defendant's interactions with New Jersey, the
Third Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to allow addi-
tional jurisdictional discovery and ordered reconsideration of jurisdiction
incorporating any new information resulting from that discovery. 127
IV. CONCLUSION
Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court warned that determinations
of personal jurisdiction cannot be reduced to a purely "mechanical or
quantitative" exercise. 128 The Zippo framework presented courts with a
useful tool to use in analyzing Internet-based contacts, but it should not be
viewed as a replacement for the traditional and far-reaching analysis re-
quired in personal jurisdiction determinations.1 2 9 The Third Circuit, in
its ruling in Toys "R" Us, confirmed the complexities of Internet-based per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis by requiring courts to conduct more expansive
and fact-intensive analyses of all attendant circumstances, rather than fo-
cusing exclusively on the nature of a defendant's website.130 While this
can lead to results that diverge from the Zippo scale, it is more consistent
with traditional personal jurisdiction analysis. 13 1
Interactivity along the Zippo sliding scale remains an important factor
in an Internet-based personal jurisdiction analysis because it can often
provide evidence of a defendant's intent or knowledge. 13 2 Regarding
v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (expressly in-
corporating intentionality requirement for Internet-based jurisdiction); Neogen
Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (requiring
nonresident defendant's website reveal "specifically intended interaction" with re-
sidents of state to support jurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d
414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring evidence of purposeful direction of nonresi-
dent defendant's electronic activity towards forum state to justify jurisdiction).
127. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 458 (remanding case to lower court).
128. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ("It is evident
that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities whichjustify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be
simply mechanical or quantitative.").
129. For a discussion of the role of the Zippo framework in the context of
traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, see supra notes 124-27 and accompany-
ing text.
130. See MITCHELL SILBERG & KNUPP LLP, supra note 115 (commenting on
Third Circuit's decision in Toys "R" Us).
131. Just as the Supreme Court's holding in Asahi required connections be-
tween a defendant and the forum state to derive from actions purposefully di-
rected at that state, the Toys "R" Us decision similarly makes the defendant's intent
behind its activities the determining factor in jurisdiction. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at
104 ("[A] finding of minimum contacts must derive from an action purposely di-
rected toward the forum State.") (emphasis added); see also Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at
454 ("T] here must be evidence that the defendant 'purposefully availed' itself of
conducting activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its website to the state,
knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via its website, or through
sufficient other related contacts.").
132. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 452 ("If a defendant web site operator inten-
tionally targets the[ir] [web]site to the forum state, and/or knowingly conducts
954 [Vol. 49: p. 931
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website interactivity as the only factor to be weighed, however, leads to re-
sults less consistent with contemporary notions of fair play and substantial
justice inherent in personal jurisdiction analysis. 13 3 Although the Toys "R"
Us court did not address the exact mix of Internet and non-Internet con-
tacts required to support jurisdiction, the ruling requires courts to con-
tinue evaluating even Internet-basedjurisdictional claims on a case-by-case
basis, focusing on the nature and quality of online and offline contacts to
demonstrate the requisite intent needed to establish personal
jurisdiction.134
This express intent requirement can cut both ways, bringing passive
websites under a remote court's jurisdiction or placing commercial web-
sites outside a foreign court's reach, depending on the intent of the web-
site owner. 135 Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating factual support
for extending personal jurisdiction, but courts must assist plaintiffs with
jurisdictional discovery to investigate non-frivolous claims. 13 6 The Toys
"R" Us ruling gives plaintiffs grounds to support broader jurisdictional dis-
covery into a defendant's business practices allowing examination of on-
line and offline contacts to discern the intent underlying a defendant's
Internet-based activities. 13 7
Website owners seeking to avoid being haled into distant jurisdictions
need to be wary of more than the overt reach of their online contacts.138
Limiting online sales or website interactivity alone is not likely to be
enough to avoid the exercise of jurisdiction in remote forums.' 39 Any in-
business with forum state residents via the site, then the "purposeful availment"
requirement is satisfied.").
133. See generally Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (requiring exercise of personal
jurisdiction to "comport[ ] with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice").
134. See Laura Seeto, Purposeful Availment Required for US Jurisdiction, N.S.W.
Soc. FOR COMPUTERS AND L.J. (Mar. 2003, Issue 51), at http://www.nswscl.org.au/
journal/51/LauraSeeto.html (discussing case-by-case review required by Toys "R"
Us ruling).
135. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 453 (finding evidence that, although
nonresident defendant's website was interactive, "defendant intentionally and
knowingly transacted business with residents of the forum state, and had signifi-
cant other contacts with the forum besides those generated by its website" still
necessary to extend jurisdiction); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (extending jurisdiction over Illinois defendant's passive web-
site based on finding intent to cause injury in California).
136. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026,
1042 (3d Cir. 1997) (requiring courts to permit jurisdictional discovery unless
plaintiff's claim is "clearly frivolous").
137. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 456 (noting process for granting request for
jurisdictional discovery).
138. See id. at 456 (noting non-Internet contacts may provide "something
more" to bring foreign defendant under local court's jurisdiction).
139. See, e.g., Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d
824, 838 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding jurisdiction over foreign website proper despite
attempts to limit website's reach). For a discussion of the Euromarket Designs court's
analysis, see supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
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dicia of a defendant's intentional interactions with a forum state, online or
offline, can support a distant plaintiff's jurisdictional claim arising from a
defendant's Internet activities. 140 While this may make jurisdictional anal-
ysis more complex, Toys "R" Us realigns the personal jurisdiction standard




140. See Toys "R" Us, 318 F.3d at 455 n.6 (noting intent requirement is key
.component for jurisdiction under either 'minimum contacts' analysis or 'effects'
test").
141. For a discussion of the traditional rules of personal jurisdiction applied
to offline activities, see supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
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